Properly considering all potential risk factors through tradable liquid portfolios in the context of a risk based factor model is paramount to quantifying the benefits of investing in hedge funds. We attempt to span the space of potential risk factors with exchange traded funds (ETFs). We develop a methodology of hedge fund return replication with ETFs based on cluster analysis and LASSO factor selection that overcomes multicollinearity among ETFs and the data mining bias. We find that the overall out-of-sample accuracy of hedge fund replication with ETFs increases with the number of ETFs available. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to a multitude of alternative risk factors that could be driving hedge fund returns.
Introduction
Hedge funds have experienced tremendous growth in recent years, with more than $2.6 trillion currently invested in hedge funds globally, 1 and are now considered an essential part of alternative investment strategies by institutional investors and financial institutions. Hedge funds have been able to produce returns with relatively low correlations with major asset classes, like stocks and bonds, due to the multitude of investment opportunities available to hedge fund managers. Hedge fund managers have the flexibility to invest in non-traditional asset classes (including derivative securities), employ leverage, and engage in short sales. However, such strategies also expose investors to alternative risk factors that may not be easy to quantify, given the opacity of the hedge fund industry. It is then natural to question whether the returns earned by hedge fund managers are due to managerial skill, or merely compensation for exposure to alternative risk factors. If a significant portion of hedge fund returns comes from alternative risk factor exposures, then it is reasonable to presume that it is possible for investors to replicate that part of hedge fund returns at a lower cost by taking on these risk exposures themselves.
However, such exercise hinges on the ability to identify and quantify these alternative risk factors via proxies of portfolios of tradable and liquid securities. 2 That is why the issue of choosing appropriate risk factors is central to any study of hedge fund performance, and currently there is no set of factors that is universally accepted across the literature. 1 According to Hedge Fund Research, Inc. January 21, 2014 press release. 2 Notice that if there is no tradable option available to investors for a particular alternative risk factor, then it could be argued that hedge funds are valuable by merely providing access to that risk exposure. Such exposure through hedge funds comes at a high premium in the form of management and incentive fees. 3 For example, return attribution studies Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) introduce new trend following and option based risk factors in addition to Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors. On the other hand, hedge fund replication studies Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) , Amenc, Martellini, Meyfredi, and Ziemann (2010) , and Giamouridis and Paterlini (2010) employ liquid index portfolios available to investors.
Properly identifying and fully accounting for all potential risk factors through tradable liquid portfolios in the context of a risk based factor model is paramount to quantifying the benefits of investing in hedge funds. If we could successfully span the entire space of alternative risk factors, then we would be able to achieve two important objectives: first, separate skill driven from risk driven hedge fund returns, thus identifying hedge fund managers who possess genuine skill (or the lack of thereof), and, second, replicate the risk driven hedge fund return component at a lower cost by avoiding hedge fund fee structure.
In this paper we attempt to span the space of potential risk factors with exchange traded funds (ETFs) from 1997 to 2012. This time period saw an explosion in ETFs available, with the number of U.S. listed passively managed ETFs going from 19 in 1997 to 1313 in 2012. During the time period of our study the ETF coverage of alternative risk factors went from almost nonexistent in 1997 to being comprehensive, with ETFs currently providing access to a great variety of alternative strategies that were previously available only to hedge funds or institutional investors. 4 This provides us with a unique opportunity to investigate how the expanding space of alternative risk factors affects the quality of hedge fund replication with ETFs available at the time.
While the large number of ETFs available in the later years of our study allows for more complete spanning of the space of risk factors, it also increases potential for spurious results due to excessive data mining. We develop a new methodology for linear hedge fund return replication that overcomes multicollinearity among ETFs, and also minimizes data mining bias, while utilizing all ETFs available. Our focus on hedge fund return replication with subsequent out-of-sample testing of hedge fund clones highlights the efficacy of our methodology in mitigating the data mining bias. We test the performance of our hedge fund clones in-and outof-sample, and find that the overall accuracy of hedge fund replication with ETFs increases with the number of ETFs available. We find that in the subperiod starting in 2005, the overall out-ofsample performance of the portfolio of all hedge funds is not statistically different from the portfolio of clones. We attribute this to the sufficiently large number of available ETFs in the later years, which allow us to successfully span the space of hedge fund risk factors.
In a departure from previous hedge fund replication studies, we go beyond considering replicating hedge fund indexes or average hedge fund performance. We consider portfolios of "cloneable" and "non-cloneable" hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R 2 matches.
Intuitively, we shouldn't expect success in hedge fund return replication for a truly skilled hedge fund manager who pursues investment opportunities uncorrelated with risk factors, delivering true alpha to investors. On the other hand, we fully expect success in return replication for a manager who follows a rigid formulaic strategy, like writing out of the money put options on the S&P 500 index, earning returns by exposing investors to an easily quantifiable alternative risk
factor. An illustration of our success in out-of-sample return replication of a particular "cloneable" hedge fund 5 is provided in figure 1.
Consistent with the above intuition, we find that the portfolio of clones created with our procedure provides better 6 out-of-sample performance than the portfolio of "cloneable" hedge funds, which is likely due to the lower fee structure among the clones. Furthermore, the portfolio 5 This particular (anonymous) hedge fund is in the "fixed income" self-reported style, it has an inception year of 2004, and it was active at the end of our study period. Notice that the out-of-sample comparison begins in 2008, after dropping the first two years of observations to control for the backfill bias, and after using another two years for the in-sample clone matching. 6 Although not to the point of statistical significance.
of "cloneable" hedge funds does not produce significantly positive risk-adjusted performance, measured by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha. Hence we conclude that there is no statistical evidence of managerial skill in the set of "cloneable" hedge funds, and these funds can be successfully replicated with ETFs.
Finally, the out-of-sample portfolio of "non-cloneable" hedge funds produces significantly positive mean excess returns along with a Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha, outperforming the portfolio of clones. This can be interpreted as evidence of managerial skill among the managers of "non-cloneable" hedge funds.
We conclude that our methodology provides value in both identifying skilled managers of "non-cloneable" hedge funds, and also successfully replicating out-of-sample returns that are due to alternative risk exposures of "cloneable" hedge funds, thus providing a transparent and liquid alternative to investors who may find these return patterns attractive. 
Related literature
Our methodology directly extends the factor based hedge fund replication literature that goes back to Sharpe (1992) style analysis approach. In its original form, it constructs a replicating portfolio by relying on constrained beta coefficients from a linear regression on a set of relevant factors. Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) proxies to a multitude of alternative risk factors affecting hedge fund returns. We develop a methodology based on cluster analysis and LASSO selection methodology that overcomes multicollinearity among ETFs, and also minimizes data mining bias, resulting in parsimonious factor selection. We test the performance of our hedge fund clones in-and out-of-sample, and find that the overall accuracy of hedge fund replication with ETFs increases with the number of ETFs available. Our out-of-sample portfolio approach allows minimizing the hedge fund attrition bias that Ben Dor, Jagannathan, Meier, and Xu (2012) find to be a major driver of poor hedge fund index clone performance against hedge fund index benchmarks.
Another major contribution is in considering risk adjusted performance of "cloneable" and "non-cloneable" hedge funds separately, which contributes to the literature on hedge fund risk and performance evaluation. 10 Consistent with results in Titman and Tiu (2011), we find superior out-of-sample risk adjusted performance 11 for "non-cloneable" funds, while "cloneable" funds fail to deliver significantly positive risk-adjusted performance. Hence our methodology provides value in hedge fund performance evaluation by identifying skilled managers who deliver superior out-of-sample risk adjusted performance.
Description of data
In this study we utilize hedge fund data from Bloomberg 12 for the period 1997-2012, which includes 18,135 unique hedge funds. 13 The data are comprehensive, including fund returns net of management and performance fees, assets under management, manager information, and fund characteristics. To minimize survivorship bias, the sample includes all funds reporting during our sample period, including those that are acquired, liquidated, or chose to stop reporting. We 10 See, for example, Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010), Titman and Tiu (2011 ), Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2011 ), Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012 ), Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011 , 2012 ), Avramov, Barras, and Kosowski (2013 ), and Jurek and Stafford (2013 As quantified by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha. 12 Bloomberg is the most common platform used by both hedge funds, who utilize news, analysis, research, and trading tools, and accredited investors, who use Bloomberg data to research hedge funds, private equity firms, and other alternative investment vehicles. Bloomberg aggregates data on live and dead funds inclusive of fund and parent company descriptions, manager and contact information, total assets under management, fees, past performance, and management style. 13 We do not include funds of hedge funds in our sample.
partially offset the effects of backfill bias by eliminating the first 24 months of reported returns. 68% of funds are non-U.S. domiciled. The most common declared style is long-short equity, at 29% of all funds, while equity statistical arbitrage is the least common style, accounting for 1% of hedge funds.
14 The 24 month backfill correction is in line with results in Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) and Titman and Tiu (2011) suggesting dropping the first 25 and 27 months of returns. 15 After deleting the first 24 months of observations. 16 High water marks are investor relevant, that is, an investor will not be charged incentive fees until profits accrue over a previous high, net of flows. Thus, not all investors are charged incentive fees in any given year; it is partially determined by when the investor capital was employed by the fund manager. An investor whose fund shares are worth more this year than last will be charged incentive fees. An investor who suffered a loss previously will not pay incentive fees until previous losses are regained. . This implies that with the increase of the number of ETFs available, the investment opportunity set has broadened dramatically, and our hedge fund replicating process gains more accuracy when approaching the later years in our sample. In this study, we employ cluster analysis and LASSO regression procedure to find the best fit risk factors to clone real hedge fund returns, and we utilize two years of previous monthly ETF returns for the matching process. Figure 3 reports the actual number of ETFs used for each two year window. In the early years, there are relatively few ETFs around, which makes the cloning procedure less accurate. So as to provide a better picture of the replication outcome, we split our whole sample period into two subperiods, period 1997-2004 and period 2005-2012 , where in the first period, we have fewer than 100 ETFs available for matching procedures, while more than 100 ETFs can be included in the cluster analysis and later LASSO matching regression in the second period. Arguably, we expect to see better matching and replications for the second period 2005-2012. 17 Benchmark indexes that retained ETFs track may not be publicly available. Some funds track in-house indexes. 18 There are fewer ETFs than 5 ETFs available prior to 1997, which makes our methodology meaningless in 1994-1996, and we exclude these years from further analysis.
Research methodology

4.a. Style analysis with ETFs
Our ETF database includes a total number of 1,313 unique ETFs across the whole sample period. In order to clone a hedge fund using the large set of risk factors, we must choose the appropriate replicating factors first. We employ a factor selection model termed "LASSO" (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) proposed in Tibshirani (1996) . For a given parameter t, LASSO regression identifies an optimal set of factors with non-zero coefficients such that where r is the vector of hedge fund monthly returns in our research and X is the vector of ETF monthly returns.
Conceptually, provided a set of factors, LASSO regression determines the appropriate factors to be selected through an optimization approach. In the constrained form of ordinary least squares regressions, the sum of absolute values of the beta coefficients are estimated and constrained to be smaller than a specific parameter. For a given selection parameter t, some of the beta coefficients could be zero if the corresponding factors reveals little or no information about the dependent variable. As a result, LASSO regression "shrinks" the set of regression factors until the beta coefficients are the solution of the optimization problem. However, before adding all ETFs as explanatory variables in LASSO regression, we need to tackle the multicollinearity in the comprehensive set of ETFs. Although our ETFs database has factored in a broad set of trading strategies, it is not surprising that some ETFs are exposed to similar risk factors therefore exhibiting similar or even the same return patterns. And even though LASSO regression could be a powerful selection method in dealing with collinearity, it is not feasible for LASSO regressions to handle collinearity for such a large number of closely correlated ETF factors in a meaningful way.
To address this problem, we conduct cluster analysis among ETFs in order to reduce the number of ETF factors prior to running LASSO regressions. For every ETF in each cluster we calculate the distance away from the center of its cluster, as defined by the SDI measure from Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) . This distance measure for an ETF i is calculated as one minus the correlation of the ETF's return with the mean return of all ETFs from the same cluster I, i.e. 
The lower the SDI, the closer the ETF is from the center of its cluster. We specify the ETF with the lowest SDI as a proxy for all the ETFs in the same cluster, and then we include this ETF as a replicating factor in LASSO regression. This approach allows efficient spanning of the space of potential risk factors, while mitigating multicollinearity by maximizing the distance between ETFs used.
Because the number of ETFs changes over time and we don't know the true number of clusters, we assume that the number of clusters ranges from 1 to 100. We set the maximum number to 100 since we believe it is an efficient and sufficiently large set of investment opportunities (since there are less than 100 ETFs for years before 2003, we set the maximum number of cluster as the number of ETFs during those years). We then iteratively run cluster analysis for a hundred times and use the corresponding number of ETFs (each selected ETF is located at the center of its cluster) in LASSO regression. Consequently, after running cluster analysis and LASSO regressions, each fund would have one hundred corresponding models. We then choose the model which yields the lowest SBC score as our clone model. Such an approach minimizes data mining bias, resulting in parsimonious factor selection.
The basic model for LASSO regression is as follows:
where ri,gross is the gross monthly return of fund i, and rf is the risk free rate proxied by the monthly return of the 30-day U.S. Treasury bill. We use gross hedge fund returns 19 on the left hand side, since we try replicating hedge fund return patterns that are driven by exposure to alternative risk factors. Otherwise, the true factor risk driven hedge fund returns would be altered if we consider them net-of-fees, and hence the matched ETF risk profile would not reflect the true factor risk exposures. We also suppress the intercept in regressions because intercept captures the management fees incorporated in hedge fund returns and we have already added 19 See Appendix A for details on the gross returns calculations.
back the fees. In a slight departure from Sharpe (1992) style analysis methodology, we don't restrict beta coefficients to be positive or add up to one, as imposing such restrictions would likely result in model misspecification in the context of hedge funds that are free to take leverage and short positions.
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In order to quantify the dynamic nature of hedge funds' investment activities, we run the LAR LASSO methodology for model [M] for every hedge fund in our data over a set of two year windows, rolling them annually over the sample period. We consider adjusted-R 2 and SBC values from these matching regressions as in-sample proxies of the "overall quality" of our matching procedure. We interpret higher R 2 and lower SBC values as indicators of our methodology's success in capturing hedge fund risk factors, and thus potential for cloning hedge fund returns with ETFs.
However, the ultimate goal is to test the predictive power of the methodology, as to validate the in-sample explanatory power manifested by high R 2 and low SBC values. For each hedge fund, we consider the corresponding ETF matches selected through the previous two year window LASSO regression and their coefficients, and then construct the hedge fund clone by loading selected ETFs with regression determined weights. The hedge fund clone performance after the matching period is then given by , ,
where , −1 is the coefficient from the previous two year window LASSO selected ETF j. We rely on net-of-fees returns for both hedge funds and their ETF matches in our out-of-sample 20 ter Horst, Nijman, and de Roon (2004) demonstrate that imposing unwarranted style based constraints can lead to biased risk exposure estimates.
analysis, 21 as we compare future returns from an investor perspective. Finally, we address the survivorship bias among hedge funds by constructing out-of-sample portfolios and rebalancing them when hedge funds drop out of the database.
4.b. "Cloneable" and "non-cloneable" hedge funds
In a departure from previous hedge fund replication studies, we go beyond exploring aggregate characteristics of clones versus hedge funds they replicate. Instead we concentrate on comparing "cloneable" and "non-cloneable" hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R 2 matches. We argue that the success in hedge fund replication depends on a hedge fund manager's style, and that properly deconstructing that style is paramount for assessing the true value of a hedge fund for investors. For example, if a hedge fund manager has genuine ability and pursues a unique strategy uncorrelated with identifiable risk factors in a "non-cloneable" fund, then we shouldn't expect success in replicating such fund performance. On the other hand, if a manager pursues algorithmic strategies highly correlated with risk factors in a "cloneable"
fund, then we expect success in out-of-sample replication, as our hedge fund clone would deliver a similar risk and return profile, but at a lower cost compared to the "cloneable" fund.
Furthermore, it would be unlikely to find evidence of superior risk adjusted managerial skill in "cloneable" funds in the context of a return attribution model, as their performance would be driven mostly by factor risk exposures.
Empirical results
5.a. Matching regressions
Our matching (or "cloning") procedure is based on in-sample LAR LASSO regressions for model [M] , with the best model chosen according to the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), as described in the previous section. Lastly, the average number of factors selected by the LAR LASSO procedure is 2.22 for the whole sample period, which indicates that our methodology results in a parsimonious factor selection.
5.b. Out-of-sample clone performance
As noted before, our methodology of running LASSO regressions on a variable number of ETFs, and using SBC or a statistical model selection does minimizes data mining bias and yields a parsimonious factor selection. However, the ultimate test of our methodology lies in considering out-of-sample performance of hedge fund clones versus hedge funds they replicate.
As described in the methodology section, we construct a hedge fund clone as a linear combination of model selected ETFs with the matching regression determined weights. Then the out-of-sample performance of a hedge fund clone is given by the equation (3). It is important to 22 While our date extends until 2012, we don't use 2012 in matching regressions, as we need at least one year of data for out-of-sample tests of our matches. 23 We chose 2003 as the break year, since it is the first year when there are more than 100 ETFs available, which allows full utilization of our methodology based on a variable number of ETF clusters up to 100.
reiterate that out-of-sample, we rely on net-of-fees returns for both hedge funds and their ETF clones, as we compare out-of-sample returns from an investor perspective. 24 Finally, we calculate tracking errors as the differences in returns between the clone and the corresponding hedge fund, i.e.
, , , . to span the set of potential hedge fund risk factors.
5.c. Cloneable and non-cloneable hedge funds
While the results in table III indicate that the performance of clones is comparable with performance of hedge funds in aggregate, they hide a wide discrepancy among individual funds.
In this section we consider two groups of hedge funds, selected as top and bottom in-sample R 2 matches. We define the funds that are well matched with high R 2 as "cloneable", and the funds with relatively low matching R 2 as "non-cloneable".
As our methodology allows to effectively span the space of potential risk factors, the R 2 could be viewed as a proxy for how easily quantifiable or "decipherable" the investment strategy 24 Recall that the in-sample matching regressions rely on gross returns, as we want to get closest possible matches to "true" hedge fund strategies, as carried out by hedge fund managers. 25 The choice of 2004 as the out-of-sample break year is consistent with 2003 being the in-sample break year, since it is the first year when out-of-sample predictions based on more than 100 ETFs available. It is important to point out that we rely on gross returns for the in-sample matching with the objective to fully account for all the risk factors inherent in the strategies pursued by hedge fund managers, or, in other words, to "decipher" any passive strategies being used by hedge fund managers. On the other hand, we use net-of-fees returns in our out-of-sample analysis, as we compare returns form an investor perspective. This means that we shouldn't expect a 100% outof-sample match, even if we were 100% successful in uncovering the true passive strategy of a hedge fund manager, since our ETF based clone has a much lower fee structure compared to the hedge fund being cloned. In fact, if we were indeed successful in "deciphering" of the true 28 Based on providing very little in terms of truly active portfolio management. Furthermore, the fact that the clones of "cloneable" hedge funds also demonstrate negative average out-of-sample skewness could be interpreted as our methodology's success in "deciphering" strategies of cloneable funds, and producing clones with similar risk and return profiles.
Finally, tables VI and VII demonstrate that our methodology could not provide a good insample match for non-cloneable funds, and the clones were not successful in delivering comparable out-of-sample performance. 31 This is consistent with the interpretation of truly active hedge fund management of non-cloneable funds that could be of benefit to potential investors.
However, the non-cloneable hedge funds have almost one and a half time higher average attrition rate than cloneable funds, which could be indicative of higher risks, not quantifiable with our methodology, among non-cloneable hedge funds.
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30 Payoffs from such strategies, like writing out of the money put options on the S&P 500 index, may look pretty attractive from the point of not very sophisticated investors. 31 As clones yielded negative average tracking errors, high tracking error volatility, and could not match the skewness of non-cloneable funds. 32 This is consistent with Bollen (2013) findings of higher probability of failure for zero-R 2 hedge funds.
5.d. Out-of-sample portfolio analysis
We now concentrate on out-of-sample portfolio tests for the following reasons. First, by considering all funds up until the moment of their disappearance from the database, we minimize the effects of the survivorship bias. Second, the portfolio approach allows for out-of-sample risk adjusted performance evaluation of hedge funds and their clones over long periods of time.
We form portfolios on December 31, 1998. We invest the same dollar amount into each fund within a portfolio in the beginning, and follow its net-of-fees performance until December This confirms our suggestion that the quality of replication is highly influenced by the number of available ETFs. Looking at the first period performance alone, we find that real hedge funds deliver significantly better returns than the clones, which is consistent with our previous observations of the matching quality in the first period being worse than in the second. In the second period of 2005-2012, we find that the clones do reasonably well in terms of producing similar return patterns and skewness, almost the same monthly excess returns, as well as pretty close risk adjusted measures, i.e. Fung and Hsieh (2004) alphas, Sharpe ratios, and information ratios. We then conclude that our matching methodology can produce hedge fund clones that on average deliver similar payoffs to real hedge funds, given a broad selection of ETFs representing potential hedge fund risk factors.
5.e. Out-of-sample portfolio analysis for cloneable and non-cloneable funds
We now apply the out-of-sample portfolio approach to analyzing portfolios of cloneable and is consistent with non-cloneable hedge fund managers adding value through actively managing their funds. Furthermore, the active investment management skills of these managers seem to be truly unique, and cannot be replicated with ETFs, or by simply taking positions in well defined risk factors. However, as mentioned before, the non-cloneable hedge funds have almost one and a half time higher average attrition rate than cloneable funds, which could be indicative of high hidden risks associated with their active management style. 37 Unfortunately, these risks might be 35 Such an improvement is likely driven by the ETFs lower fee structure compared to their benchmark hedge funds. 36 Positive alpha production for low R 2 hedge funds is also consistent with results in Titman and Tiu (2011) . 37 This is consistent with Bollen (2013) findings of higher probability of failure for zero-R 2 hedge funds.
impossible to quantify, given that the investment styles of managers of non-cloneable hedge funds cannot be well explained with our methodology.
We conclude that our methodology provides value in both identifying skilled managers of non-cloneable hedge funds, and also successfully replicating out-of-sample returns that are due to alternative risk exposures of cloneable hedge funds, thus providing a transparent and liquid alternative to investors who may find these return patterns attractive.
5.f. Hedge fund styles
Here we investigate in depth what kinds of hedge funds can or cannot be replicated. We rely on hedge fund styles to tackle this question, as hedge fund managers pursue different types of investment opportunities, and it is certain that in some specific investment categories ETFs could be better suited to resemble the performance of hedge funds.
We form different portfolios based on manager claimed styles and then investigate the hedge fund and clone performances. We exclude the hedge fund styles with fewer than 300 fund-year observations in the entire sample period. Twelve styles are then included in this study: 
Conclusion
We develop a methodology of hedge fund return replication with ETFs based on cluster analysis and LAR LASSO factor selection that overcomes multicollinearity among ETFs and also minimizes data mining bias, resulting in parsimonious factor selection. We test the performance of our hedge fund clones in-and out-of-sample, and find that the overall out-ofsample accuracy of hedge fund replication with ETFs increases with the number of ETFs available. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to a multitude of alternative risk factors that could be driving hedge fund returns.
We further consider portfolios of "cloneable" and "non-cloneable" hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R 2 matches. We find that the portfolio of clones created with our procedure provides better out-of-sample performance than the portfolio of "cloneable" hedge funds. We find superior risk-adjusted performance for "non-cloneable" funds, while "cloneable" funds fail to deliver significantly positive risk-adjusted performance, which is consistent with our success in cloning them. This approach contributes to the literature on hedge fund risk and performance evaluation, enabling investors to identify skilled managers who deliver superior out-of-sample performance.
We conclude that our methodology provides value in both identifying skilled managers of "non-cloneable" hedge funds, and also successfully replicating out-of-sample returns that are due to alternative risk exposures of "cloneable" hedge funds, thus providing a transparent and liquid alternative to investors who may find these return patterns attractive.
Appendix A: Gross returns adjustments for ETFs and hedge funds
Given the fact that Bloomberg only provides net returns for individual hedge funds (net-offees, i.e. net of performance and management fees), and Morningstar provides net returns for ETFs (net of management fee), it would be less accurate to import the net returns into our matching model. So as to provide the real return series, we make adjustments to net asset returns and transfer them into estimated gross returns for both hedge funds and ETFs.
We estimate the gross returns for ETFs by adding back the reported management fees from 
where Net_ETFi,t is the reported net-of-fee ETF return from Morningstar, and Management_Feei,t is the specific ETF management fee.
We adopt the following steps to estimate the gross hedge fund return. We collect the fund management fees from Bloomberg for every individual hedge fund and add them back to the net hedge fund returns. We then adjust for the performance fees using LIBOR as the hurdle rate, 
where ri is the monthly return of fund i, rf is a risk free rate proxied by the monthly return of the 30-day U.S. Treasury bill. SP500 is the market risk premium proxied by the S&P 500 index return minus the risk free rate. EM is the MSCI Emerging Market index return minus the risk free rate. 10Year is the monthly excess return of a 10-year U.S. treasury bond, proxied by the 10- 38 We do not adjust for the "high water mark" provision here, since we do not have reliable information regarding to the cash flow of individual hedge fund, nor a complete data on assets under management for every hedge fund. 
Figure 1: An Example of Hedge Fund and Clone Out-of-Sample Returns
The figure presents the out-of-sample comparison of an anonymous hedge fund and its clone, constructed according to our in-sample matching methodology. This hedge fund is in the "fixed income" self-reported style, it has an inception year of 2004, and it was active at the end of our study period. The out-of-sample comparison begins in 2008, after dropping the first two years of observations to control for the backfill bias, and after using another two years for the in-sample clone matching. Comparisons of hedge funds portfolios and clones portfolios 1999-2012 are reported. Portfolios are formulated as of December 31, 1998, based on manager claimed styles, and rebalanced annually. Annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performances are reported. End value is as of December 31, 2012. Skewness reports the mean skewness of out-of-sample portfolio net returns for one year predicting window. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
